On the Right Use of Supervision : May 2002 : Éric Laurent

by Julia Evans on May 1, 2002

Originally published as Du bon usage de la supervision : Éric Laurent in La Cause freudienne, 05/2002, n°51. – pp. 123-133

In English translation:

Translated by Heather Chamberlain

Published by Published p27-42 of Psychoanalytical Notebooks Vol 10 2003

Available, published by the London Society of the New Lacanian School, here

Also available here

Headings

‘Thirdness’ p28

Lessons in logic p29

The dritte person p30

The place of the psychoanalyst p32

To count up to four p34

The function of supervision p34

Giving up on the desire of the analyst p36

Maintaining oneself at the level of desire p38

A doctrine of supervision p39

References & their availability

7. J. Lacan, ‘Kant avec Sade’ in Ecrits, Seuil, 1966, p.774
: see Kant with Sade: April 1963: Jacques Lacanor here : “for the unconscious a quadripartite structure is always required in the construction of a subjective ordering”. : James B. Swenson’s translation differs from Bruce Fink’s in the Complete Écrits :

p62 of James B. Swenson’s translation : Be that as it may, this form turns out to be particularly easy to animate in the present case. It articulates, in fact, the pleasure for which an instrument (objet a of the formula) has been substituted, with the sort of sustained division of the subject that the experience ordains.

Which is only obtained inasmuch as its apparent agent congeals in the rigidity of the object, in the aim that his subjective division be entirely sent back to him from the Other.

A quadripartite structure, given the unconscious, is always to be required in the construction of a subjective ordinance. Our didactic schemas satisfy this requirement.

Let us modulate the Sadian fantasy with a new one of these schemas:

9. E. Laurent, La formation de l’analyst et I’ethique, de la psychanalyse in Qui sont vos psychanalystes, op. cit. pp.457-452.
: No English translation has been found.

10. J. Lacan, Le Séminaire V: Les formations de I’inconscient, Seuil, Paris, 1998, lessons I – VII.
: See Seminar V : The Formations of the Unconscious : 1957-1958 : begins 6th November 1957 : Jacques Lacan or here  for notes and information : Page numbers in Cormac Gallagher’s translation :

1. Seminar V : 6th November 1957 : p1

2. Seminar V : 13th November 1957 : p15

3. Seminar V : 20th November 1957 : p30

4. Seminar V : 27th November 1957 : p45

5. Seminar V : 4th December 1957 : p59

6. Seminar V : 11th December 1957 : p72

7. Seminar V : 18th December 1957 : p86

12. J. Lacan, On a Question Prior to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis in ‘Ecrits: A Selection’, trans. B. Fink, WW Norton, New York, 200, p. 461. : See On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis : 1958 : Jacques Lacan or here for notes and availability :

p195-196 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : 5. The L of the questioning of the subject in his existence has a combinatory structure that must not be confused with its spatial aspect. As such, it is the signifier itself that must be articulated in the Other, especially in its position as fourth term in the topology.

As support for this structure, we find in it the three signifiers in which the Other may be identified in the Oedipus complex. They are sufficient to symbolize the significations of sexed reproduction, under the signifiers of relation, ‘love’ and ‘procreation’.

The fourth term is given by the subject in his reality, foreclosed as such in the system, and entering into the play of the signifiers only in the mode of death, but becoming the true subject to the extent that this play of the signifiers will make it signify.

This play of signifiers is not, in effect, an inert one, since it is animated in each particular part by the whole history of the ancestry of real others that the denomination of signifying Others involves in the contemporaneity of the Subject. Furthermore, in so far as it is set up qua rule over and above each part, this play already structures in the subject the three agencies: ego (ideal), reality, superego, the determination of which was to be the task of the second Freudian topography.

Furthermore, the subject enters the game as the dummy (mort), but it is as a living being that he plays it; it is in his life that he must take up the suit (couleur) that he may bid. He will do so by means of a set of imaginary figures, selected from among the innumerable forms of animastic relations, the choice of which involves a certain arbitrariness, since, in order to correspond homologically to the symbolic triads, it must be numerically reduced.

13. J. Lacan ,Le Séminaire XVII: L’envers de Ia psychanalyse, Seuil, Paris, 1991, P.68.
: One is never qualified to take it : See Seminar XVII: Psychoanalysis upside down/The reverse side of psychoanalysis: 1969-1970 : from 26th November 1969: Jacques Lacanor here  for notes and information. The Cormac Gallagher translation is more complete than the Russell Grigg’s. :

Seminar XVII : 21st January 1970 : Possibly pV8 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : So then Wittgenstein only sustains the world by facts. There is no thing, unless it is sustained by a web of facts. No thing, moreover, except the inacessible. Facts alone are articulated. This fact that it is daylight is a fact by virtue of being said. The true depends – this is where I have to re-introduce the dimension I am arbitrarily separating from it – on my stating, namely, if I state something about it. The true is not internal to the proposition where there is announced ony the fact, the factitiousness of language. It is true that it is a fact, a fact constituted, in the event, by my saying it, while it is true. But that it is true is not a fact, if I do not explicitly add on that, moreover, it is true. Except that as Wittgenstein points our quite correctly, it is superfluous for me to add that it is true. Only there you are. What I have to say in place of this superfluity, is that I must really have a reason to say it, and this will be explained in what follows.

Precisely, I do not say that I have a reason, I continue with what follows, namely, my deduction, and I integrate it is daylight, perhaps as a fallacy – even if it is true – to my encouragement which may be to take advantage of it to make someone believe that he will clearly see what my intentions are. The stupidity, if I can express myself in this way, is to isolate the factitiousness of it is daylight. It is a prodigiously fruitful stupidity, because it creates a support, one that very precisely has as a result that there is pushed to its final consequences what I took support on myself, namely, that there is no meta-language. There is no other meta-language than every form of blackguardism (canailerie), if by this we designate these curious operations that are deduced from the fact that the desire of man is the desire of the Other. All blackguardism comes from wanting to be the Other – I mean the big Other – for someone, in which there is outlined the shapes in which his desire is captured. So [pV9] then this operation described as Wittgensteinian is nothing other than an extraordinary display of, a hunting down of philosophical blackguardism. The only sense is that of desire. This is what one can say after having read Wittgenstein. There is no truth except of what the aforesaid desire hides about its lack, in order to pretend to make nothing of what it finds.

14. J. Lacan, Variantes de la cure-type Écrits, op. cit. p. 341. : See Écrits : 1966 : Jacques Lacan or here for information and availability : Variations on the Standard Treatment : Easter 1955 : Jacques Lacan :

p283 of Bruce Fink’s translation : The order of subjectivity that the analyst must bring about in himself is the only thing Ferenczi indicates with an arrow at each intersection, … In all these rules, isn’t it the ego that effaces itself in order to give way to the subject-point of interpretation? Thus these rules can only take effect on the basis of the psychoanalyst’s personal analysis, and especially its end.

Where is the end of analysis as far as the ego is concerned? How can we know this if we misrecognize the ego’s function in the very action of psychoanalysis? Let us follow the path of a kind of criticism that puts a text to the test of the very principles it defends.

15. Ibid.
 : p283 of Bruce Fink’s translation : The order of subjectivity that the analyst must bring about in himself is the only thing Ferenczi indicates with an arrow at each intersection, and it is monotonously repeated by recommendations that are too varied for us not to try to grasp how they fit together. Menschenkenntnis and Menschenforschung are two terms he uses whose romantice ancestry, which pushes them toward the art of leading men and the natural history of man, allows us to appreciate what the author hopes to do with them, by way of a sure method and an open market: reduction of one’s personal impact; knowledge relegated to a subordinate position; authority that knows not to insist; goodness without indulgence; distrust of the altar of good deeds; the only resistance to be attacked being that of indifference, Ungauben, or of refusal, Ablehnung; encouraging nasty comments; and true modesty regarding one’s knowledge. In all these rules, … (See Footnote 14)

16. J. Lacan, Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School in Analysis No 6, Melbourne, 1995. : There are significant differences between the translation used in Laurent’s text and both Russell Grigg’s and Cormac Gallagher’s translation : See ‘Proposal of 9th October 1967 
on the psychoanalyst of the School’: Jacques Lacan or here for information and notes :

‘destitution’ : p10 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : The structure thus abridged allows you to form an idea of what happens at the end of the transference relation, that is: when the desire that sustained the psychoanalysand in his operation is resolved, he no longer wants at the end to take up its option, that is the remainder which as the determinant of his division, makes it fall from his phantasy and destitutes him as subject.

Is this not the great secret that we psychoanalysts have to keep mum about, since we derive our self-sufficiency from it, when beatitude is being offered beyond by our forgetting it ourselves?

Would we not by announcing it, discourage those who might take it up? Subjective destitution is written on the entry ticket…? Is this not enough to provoke horror, indignation, panic, or even outrage, in any case to give a pretext for an objection in principle?

Simply to prohibit what is indispensable to our being, is to expose ourselves to a turn of fate that is a curse. What is refused in the symbolic, let us recall the Lacanian verdict on it, reappears in the real.

17. Ibid. : ‘the effacement of the name’ & ‘reduce to any old signifier’ : p12 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : In this change of tack where the subject sees capsizing the assurance he got from this phantasy in which each person’s window onto the real is constituted, what is perceived, is that the grasp of desire is nothing but that of désêtre (lack of being).

In this désêtre the inessentiality of the subject supposed to know is unveiled, from which the psychoanalyst comes to dedicate himself to the agalma of the essence of desire, ready to pay for it by being reduced, himself and his name, to any signifier whatsoever.

For he has rejected the being that did not know the cause of his phantasy at the very moment at which he has finally become this supposed knowledge.

18. J. Lacan, Discours à I’École Freudienne de Paris in Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p.262. : Published p261 of Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan : See here for notes and information. : See also Discours à l’EFP (sur la proposition) : 6th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan or here

(I think this is the quote!) Si désirable qu’il soit d’avoir une surface (qu’on irait bien de l’intérieur à ébranler), elle n’a de portée que d’intimider, non d’ordonner.

L’impropre n’est pas qu’un quelconque s’attribue la supériorité, voire le sublime de l’écoute, ni que le groupe se garantisse sur ses marges thérapeutiques, c’est qu’infatuation et prudence fassent office d’organisation.

Comment espérer faire reconnaître un statut légal à une expérience dont on ne sait pas même répondre ?

19. J. Lacan, On a Question Prior, op. cit. p.211.
 : : See On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis : 1958 : Jacques Lacan or here for notes and availability :

p221 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : Thus the last word in which ‘the internal experience’ of our century should have yielded us its computation, is articulated fifty years ahead of its time in the theodicy to which Schreber is exposed: ‘God is a tart’ (Dieu est une p…).[Footnote 40  Under the form: Die Sonne ist eine Hure (S. 284 -App.). For Schreber, the sun is the central aspect of God. The interior experience referred to here is the title of Georges Bataille’s most central work. In Madame Edwards, he describes the strange extremity of this experience. ]

The term, in which the process by which the signifier has ‘unleashed’ itself in the real culminates, after the failure of the Name-of-the-Father was opened up – that is to say, the failure of the signifier in the Other, as locus of the signifier, is the signifier of the Other as locus of the law.

And therefore the time being I will leave this question that is preliminary to any possible treatment of the psychoses – a question that introduces, as we see, the conception to be formed of the handling, in this treatment, of the transference.

To say that on this terrain we can do anything would be premature, because it would now be to go ‘beyond Freud’, and there can be no question of going beyond Freud when post-Freud psychoanalysis has, as I have said, gone back to an earlier stage.

At least that is what separates me from any other object than to restore access to the experience that Freud discovered.

For to use the technique that he established, outside the experience to which it was applied, is as stupid as to toil at the oars when the ship is on sand.

20. J .Lacan, Conférences et entretiens dans des universités nord-américaines in Scilicet No 6/7, Seuil, Paris, 1976, p. 42.
 : See Columbia University Auditorium, School of International Affairs: 1st December 1975: Jacques Lacan or here for notes and information :

P1 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : I have tried to specify something about analysts that I have named analytic discourse.

Analytic discourse exists because it is the analysand who sustains it (le tient) . . . fortunately (heureusement). He has the heur (h-e-u-r), the heur, which is sometimes a bon-heur,[1 – Happiness or good luck [tr.]. ] to have met an analyst. This doesn’t always happen. Often the analyst believes the philosopher’s stone–if I can say this–of his profession consists of remaining silent. I happen to do what are called supervisions. I don’t know why they call it supervision. It’s a super-audition. I mean, it is very surprising that one might, in hearing what a practitioner has told you–surprising, that through what he says to you, you can have a representation of the one who is in analysis, the analysand. This is a new dimension. I will soon speak of this fact, the dit-mension, which I write not at all as one usually writes it in French. The best thing for me to do is to make an effort and show you how I write it:

dit-mension

That’s how I write it . . . dit-mension . . . which is to say–in English, this is

understood–mention, the place where a said (dit) reposes.

(p43) So the analyst, nonetheless, has some things to say. He has some things to say to his analysand, to the one who, all the same, is not there to encounter the simple silence of the analyst. What the analyst has to say is of the order of the truth.

21. J. Lacan, Discours à l’EFP, op. cit., p.266.
: See Footnote 18. :

I suspect this is the quote, in French : C’est là qu’un contrôle pourrait sembler n’être pas de trop, même s’il en faut plus pour nous dicter la proposition.

C’est autre chose que de contrôler un « cas » : un sujet (je souligne) que son acte dépasse, ce qui n’est rien, mais qui, s’il dépasse son acte, fait l’incapacité que nous voyons fleurir le parterre des psychanalystes : [qui se manifestera devant le siège de l’obsessionnel par exemple, de céder à sa demande de phallus, à l’interpréter en termes de coprophage, et ainsi, de la fixer à sa chiasse, à ce qu’on fasse enfin défaut à son désir].

À quoi a à répondre le désir du psychanalyste? À une nécessité que nous ne pouvons théoriser que de devoir faire le désir du sujet comme désir de l’Autre, soit de se faire cause de ce désir. Mais pour satisfaire à cette nécessité, le psychanalyste est à prendre tel qu’il est dans le fait, ce qui ne lui permet pas de bien faire en tous les cas de la demande, nous venons de l’illustrer.

22. ibid.
: See quote in Footnote 21 which includes the phrase ‘à l’interpréter en termes de coprophage’

23. J. Lacan, Le Séminaire V, op. cit. p.436.
 : See Seminar V : The Formations of the Unconscious : 1957-1958 : begins 6th November 1957 : Jacques Lacan or here for notes and information : Probably Seminar V : 4th June 1958 : p16 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : Bouvet’s article was published in the same journal as Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis : mid-May 1948 (Brussels) : Jacques Lacan: See here for details and information.

[24] End of J. Lacan, The Direction of Treatment and the Principles of its Power [in Écrits: A Selection, op.cit. p.262. This page reference is wrong – should be p274] : See The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power:10th-13th July 1958 : Jacques Lacan or here for information and notes :

This is the end of ‘Direction of the Treatment’ : p68-69 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : Who more fearlessly than this clinician, so firmly tied to mundane suffering, has questioned life to its meaning and not to say that it has none, a convenient way of washing one‘s hands of it, but to say that it has only one in which desire is borne by death?

A man of desire, of a desire that he followed against his inclination into ways in which he looked at himself reflected in feeling, domination and knowledge, but whose unparalleled signifier he, unaided, succeeded in unveiling like an initiate at the defunct mysteries: this phallus of which the receiving and the giving are equally impossible for the neurotic whether he knows that the Other does not have it, or that he has it, because in either case his desire is elsewhere: is to be it, and that man, whether male or female, must accept having it and not having it, on the basis of the discovery that he is not it.

Here there is inscribed that final Spaltung by which the subject articulates himself in the Logos, and on which Freud was beginning to write [12], giving us, at the ultimate point of an oeuvre that has the dimensions of being, the solution of ‘infinite‘ analysis, when his death applied to it the word Nothing.

[12] Freud, Sigmund, “Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang,” GW.XVII, : “Schriften aus dem Nachlass,” 58 — 62. : Manuscript dated January 2, 1938 (unfinished); “Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive Process,” Collected Papers V. 372 – 75.]

& the correct reference!

p65 (near end) of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : It was not until the chapter on ‘identification’ in Group psychology and the analysis of the ego : 1921, that Freud clearly distinguished this third mode of identification that is conditioned by its function of sustaining desire and which is therefore specified by the indifference of its object.

But our psychoanalysts insist: this indifferent object is the substance of the object, eat my body, drink my blood (the profanatory reference is theirs). The mystery of the redemption of the analyser is to be found in this imaginary effusion, of which the analyst is the oblate.

How can the ego on which they claim to call for help here, not be affected by the reinforced alienation to which they lead the subject? Long before Freud came on the scene, psychologists knew, even if they did not express it in these terms, that if desire is the metonymy of the want to be, the ego is the metonymy of desire.

This is how the terminal identification, in which analysts take such pride, operates.

[?] J. Lacan, Discours à I’École Freudienne de Paris in Autres Écrits, Seuil, Paris, 2001, p.262. : Published p261 of Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan : See here   for notes and information. : Published, in French, by www.aejcpp.free.fr : Available here & also available here : See Footnotes above.

25. J. Lacan, Foundation Act in Television, trans. J. Mehlman, WW Norton, New York, 1990, p. 98. : See ‘Founding Act’ 21st June 1964: Jacques Lacan or here for notes and information : p98 of Jeffrey Mehlman’s translation : I. Section for Pure Psychoanalysis, or praxis and doctrine of psychoanalysis properly speaking, which is and is nothing but – something to be established in its place – the training psychoanalysis.

The urgent problems to be raised concerning all the issues of the training analysis will have to make their way here through a sustained confrontation be­ tween individuals having had an experience of it and candidates in training. Its raison d’etre being based on what there is no reason to conceal: to wit, the need resulting from professional exigencies every time they entail for the analysand in training the incurring of a responsibility construable, if ever so slightly, as analytic.

It is within that problem and as a special case that the entry into the supervisory phase is to be situated. A prelude to defining that case according to criteria other than those of the impressions of all and the prejudices of each. For it is known that such is at present its only law, when the violation of the rule implicit in the observance of its forms is permanent.

26. ibid. : p98 of Jeffrey Mehlman’s translation : From the start and in every case qualified supervision will be within this framework assured to every practitioner trained in our École.

There will be proposed for the thus established course of study the characteristics by which I myself break with the promulgated standards of training practice, …

27. J. Lacan, La méprise du sujet supposé savoir in Scilicet No 1, Seuil, Paris, 1968, p. 40. : Also published in Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan : See here for notes and information, p329 : See The Mistaking of the Subject Supposed to Know (Naples): 14th December 1967: Jacques Lacanor here for notes and information :

p7 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : Now it is indeed in the practice to begin with that the psychoanalyst has to be equal to the structure that determines him not in its mental form, alas! that is indeed where the impasse is – but in his subject position as inscribed in the real: such an inscription is what properly defines the act.

In the structure of the mistaking of the subject supposed to know, the psycho- analyst (but who is, and where is, and when is – run the gamut of categories, which is to say the indetermination of his subject – the psychoanalyst?), the psychoanalyst however must find the certitude of his act and the gap that makes its law.

28. ibid.
: P7 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : Here is the question: who am I to dare such an elaboration? The answer is simple: a psychoanalyst. This is a sufficient answer, if one limits its scope to my having of a psychoanalyst, the practice.

Now it is indeed in the practice to begin with that the psychoanalyst has to be equal to the structure that determines him not in its mental form, alas! that is indeed where the impasse is – but in his subject position as inscribed in the real: such an inscription is what properly defines the act.

29. J. Lacan, Réponse à des étudiants en philosophie sur l’objet de la psychanalyse in Autres Écrits, op. cit. p.211.
 : p203 – 213 of Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan : Index here :

See Responses to Students of Philosophy Concerning the Object of Psychoanalysis : 19th February 1966 : Jacques Lacan or here for notes and information

p113 of Jeffrey Melhman’s translation : Therein lies the unity of the human sciences, if you like, which is to say that it provokes smiles if one fails to recognize in it the function of a limit.

It provokes smiles at a certain use of interpretation, as the sleight of hand of comprehension. An interpretation whose effects are understood is not a psychoanalytic interpretation. It is enough to have been analyzed or to be an analyst to realize that.

That is why psychoanalysis as a science will be structuralist, to the point of recognizing in science a refusal of the subject.

30. J. Lacan, La méprise du sujet supposé savoir, op. cit. p.40. : Published in Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan : See here for notes and information, p329 : See The Mistaking of the Subject Supposed to Know (Naples): 14th December 1967: Jacques Lacanor here :

p7 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : Here is the question: who am I to dare such an elaboration? The answer is simple: a psychoanalyst. This is a sufficient answer, if one limits its scope to my having of a psychoanalyst, the practice.

Now it is indeed in the practice to begin with that the psychoanalyst has to be equal to the structure that determines him not in its mental form, alas! that is indeed where the impasse is – but in his subject position as inscribed in the real: such an inscription is what properly defines the act.

In the structure of the mistaking of the subject supposed to know, the psycho- analyst (but who is, and where is, and when is – run the gamut of categories, which is to say the indetermination of his subject – the psychoanalyst?), the psychoanalyst however must find the certitude of his act and the gap that makes its law.

31. ibid,. p. 41. : p8 of Jack W. Stone’s translation Again it must be said of the psychoanalytic act that in being from its original revelation the act that never succeeds so well as from being failed [manqué], this definition does not imply (any more than elsewhere in our field) reciprocity, the notion so dear to psychological divagation.

Which is to say that it does not suffice that it founder [échoue] for it to succeed, that the failure [ratage] alone does not open the dimension of the mistaking here in question.

A certain slowness of thought in psychoanalysis, – in leaving to the games of the imaginary all that could be proffered of an experience pursued at the place where Freud had done so –, constitutes a failure without any other signification.

This is why there is a whole part of my teaching that is not the psychoanalytic act, but a thesis, and a polemic inherent to it, on the conditions that redouble the mistaking proper to the act, from a defeat [échec] in its decline.

From not having been able to change these conditions, leave my effort in the suspense of this defeat.

33. J. Lacan, De Rome 53 à Rome 67 : La psychanalyse.Raison d’un échec in Scilicet No 1, op. cit .p. 49. : p341 of Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan : See here for notes and information :

For notes & information, see From Rome ’53 to Rome ’67: Psychoanalysis: Reason for a Defeat: 15th December 1967: Jacques Lacan or here :

Quote from Jack W. Stone’s translation : Without doubt this ideal is going to be able to be analyzed, one says, in the motives of the undertaking, but this is to omit the point of existence that is the wager.

The importance of what is at stake does not matter there: it is after all ridiculous. (49) It is the step of the wager that constitutes what the psychoanalysis, in the measure of its seriousness, stakes against the subject, since, this wager, psychoanalysis [elle] must return it to its madness. But the stake obtained in the end offers this refuge from which every man makes himself a rampart against an act still without measure: the refuge of power.

One only has to hear how psychoanalysts speak of magical thinking, to feel resonate there the confirmation of the no less than magical that they push back, that of touching as no one else what is the fate of everyone: that they know nothing of their act and still less: in that the act they make enter into the game of causes is to give oneself for being its reason.

This act instituted as an opening of jouissance as masochistic, which reproduces its arrangement, the psychoanalyst corrects its hubris with an assurance, this one: that none of his peers is engulfed in this opening, that he himself therefore will know how to keep himself at its edge.

Whence this primacy given to experience, on the condition that one be quite sure of where it closes for each. The shortest is thenceforth the best. To be without hope is also to be without fear.

 

Julia Evans

Practicing Lacanian Psychoanalyst, Earl’s Court, London

 

Further texts

Of the clinic : here

Lacanian Transmission : here

Some Lacanian History : here

Topology : here

From LW working groups : here

By Éric Laurent here

By Sigmund Freud here

Notes on texts by Sigmund Freud : here

By Jacques Lacan here

Notes on texts by Jacques Lacan here