The Body in the Teaching of Jacques Lacan : May 1984 : Colette Soler

by Julia Evans on May 1, 1984

Published Jcfar Vol 6 p6-38 Winter 1995 (Journal of the Centre of Freudian Analysis & Research)

Translated by Lindsay Watson

Download here 

or, with Julia Evans’ notes, at www.LacanianWorksExchange.net   /authors a-z or authors by date  

Original publication

Text based on a transcription by Guy de Villiers of a presentation by Colette Soler. Not checked by the author. First published in Quarto, May 1984. Written versions have been published since in Italian and Spanish.

References decoded & availability 

by Julia Evans       

Reference numbers & page numbers refer to the Jcfar publication

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p6   Lacan calls parlêtres, speaking beings :  

Jacques Lacan introduced the neologism ‘parlêtre’ in 1974 to indicate that “carnal being” which is “haunted by the word.” See Press Conference at the French Cultural Center, Rome (The Triumph of Religion) : 29th October 1974 : Jacques Lacan Availability given here 

Related text : The Logic and Surprises of Supervision at the Time of the Parlêtre : 7th March 2015 (Italy) : Éric Laurent or here  

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p6   discovery of what Freud termed “beyond the pleasure principle”  : See Beyond the Pleasure Principle : 1920g : Sigmund Freud, SE XVIII  p1-64  : Available as published at www.Freud2Lacan.com at here    

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p6 Footnote 1 : “new acquisitions in physiology, the facts about chromosomal sex … and its genetic correlatives, its distinction from hormonal sex, their quota in anatomical determination.”   : J. Lacan, Écrits, p. 726 : Section IV, The Shine [Éclat] of Absences, p611 of Bruce Fink’s translation : see Guiding Remarks for a Congress on Feminine Sexuality : 1958 [Presented in Amsterdam, 5th September 1960] : Jacques Lacan or here  : See p88 of Jacqueline Rose’s translation : 

IV Glaring omissions

A summary of this kind would bring out certain omissions, whose interest cannot simply be dismissed as ‘not proven’:

1. On the one hand, recent developments within physiology. such as the fact of chromosomic sexuality and its genetic correlates, as distinct from hormonal sexuality, and the relative share of each in anatomical determination; or simply what appears to be a libidinal predominance of the male hormone, to the extent of its regulating the oestrogen metabolism in the menstrual phenomenon. While the clinical interpretations of these facts may still be subject to reservations, yet they demand consideration no less for having been consistently ignored by a practice which would sooner claim messianic access to decisive chemical forces.

The fact of our keeping, here, at a distance from the real may well raise the question of the division deliberately being imposed – which if it does not belong between the somatic and the psychic, which are in fact continuous, should be made between the organism and the subject. This assumes that we repudiate the affective dimension which the theory of error lays on the subject, and articulate it as the subject of a combinatory logic which alone gives the unconscious its meaning

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p6 Tiresias’ question : One story holds that Hera and Zeus disagreed about which of the sexes experienced more pleasure during sex, with Hera arguing that the answer was men, by far. When they consulted Tiresias, he asserted that women had greater pleasure than men, and Hera thereupon struck him blind.

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p6   Lacan observed on one occasion, it has not even been able to enrich eroticism with one single new perversion. : See Seminar VII: The ethics of psychoanalysis: 1959-1960: begins 18th November 1959 : Jacques Lacan or here  :  Seminar VII : 18th November 1959 : p14-15 of Dennis Porter’s translation : No doubt something should remain open relative to the place we currently occupy in the development of erotics and to the treatment to be given, not simply to one individual or other, but to civilization and its discontents. Perhaps we should give up the hope of any genuine innovation in the field of ethics – and to a certain extent one might say that a sign of this is to be found in the fact that, in spite of all our theoretical progress, we haven’t even been able to create a single new perversion. But it would be a definite sign that we have really arrived at the heart of the problem of existing perversions, if we managed to deepen our understanding of the economic role of masochism.

Related texts:

Notes on Seminar VII: 18th November 1959 from page 7 to 15 (Wo es war, … & polymorphous perversion & definition of Jouissance & Happiness)   by Julia Evans on 6th October 2012 or here  

Further comments on ‘perverse jouissance’: Seminar VII: session of 18th November 1959 by Julia Evans on 22nd October 2012 or here  

Further on Seminar VII  here 

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p8 Freud’s system perception-consciousness : See The Project for a Scientific Psychology: 23rd & 25th September & 5th October 1895: Sigmund Freud  or  here    http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=401   :  Examined in Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: 1954-1955: begins 17th November 1954 : Jacques Lacan See here 

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p8  Well, leaving aside Hartmann, Lowenstein, or even Kris, : Further information at texts on Lacanian history   here,  by Heinz Hartmann   here ,  by Rudolf Loewenstein   here ,  by Ernst Kris (fresh brains’ dream)  here ,  

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p8 Margaret Mahler : Margaret Schönberger Mahler (May 10, 1897 – October 2, 1985) was a Hungarian physician, who later became interested in psychiatry. She was a central figure on the world stage of psychoanalysis. Her main interest was in normal childhood development, but she spent much of her time with psychiatric children and how they arrive at the “self”. Mahler developed the separation–individuation theory of child development.  Object constancy, similar to Jean Piaget’s object permanence, describes the phase when the child understands that the mother has a separate identity and is truly a separate individual. Note : Mahler was alive in 1984 and living since 1938 in New York.

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p8   there are two innate characteristics which come from the body, and which no-one can influence. In order to help understand them, it is not psychoanalysis that is called upon, but Piaget.  : Piaget is mentioned by Jacques Lacan in Seminar X & Seminar XI : See Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts: 1963-1964 : beginning 15th January 1964 : Jacques Lacan or here : Seminar XI : 27th May 1964, p208 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : The  Piagetic error—for those who might think that this is a neologism, I would stress that I am referring to Monsieur Piaget—is an error that lies in the notion of what is called the egocentric discourse of the child, defined as the stage at which he lacks what this Alpine psychology calls reciprocity. Reciprocity is very far from the horizon of what we mean at that particular moment, and the notion of egocentric discourse is a misunderstanding. The child, in this discourse, which may be tape-recorded, does not speak for himself, as one says. No doubt, he does not address the other, if one uses here the theoretical distinction derived from the function of the I and the you. But there must be others there—it is while all these little fellows are there, indulging altogether, for example, in little games of operations, as they are provided within certain methods of so-called active education, it is there that they speak—they don’t speak to a particular person, they just speak, if you’ll pardon the expression, à la cantonade.1 [Footnote 1 : To speak ‘à Ia cantonade’ is to speak  to nobody in particular, to the company at large. By stressing the first letters of the phrase, Lacan is punning on his own name[Tr.]

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p9  :  the relations which define the signifying structure are already inscribed in it, inhabit it, as Lacan says.  Seminar IV : 6thFebruary 1957  :  See Seminar IV : The Object Relation & Freudian Structures 1956-1957 : begins 21st November 1956 : Jacques Lacan or here :  last paragraph of Earl’s Court Collectives’ provisional translation  :  He [Freud] explains to us that there is an identification, on the part of the ideal ego, with objects which are in the text supposed to be all the same. Simply, if we look at the schema, we notice that he made sure to connect these three objects which we might otherwise suppose to be identical, with an external object behind all these objects. Can you not see in this a striking indication of a direction, a resemblance to what I am trying to explain to you? Namely, that the ideal ego does not simply concern an object, but something that is beyond the object and is reflected in this case, as Freud puts it, not purely and simply in the ego which, to be sure, can feel something of it and become impoverished by it, but in something else in [the ego’s] very foundations – in its first forms, its first demands, and in fact, the first veil it projects, in the form of the ego ideal. 

If you know of more references, please contact Julia Evans.

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p9 Footnote 2  :  article by Lacan called “Beyond the reality principle”   :  J. Lacan, “Au-delà du principe de la réalité”, Écrits, French edition, pp. 73-92. : Beyond the “Reality Principle” : August to October 1936 : Jacques Lacan, p71 to 74 of Bruce Fink’s translation.  Available on request to Julia Evans  See Écrits : 1966 : Jacques Lacan : See here 

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p9 : an article in Scilicet 1, which is called, “La psychanalyse dans ses rapports à la réalité” [Psychoanalysis and its relations to reality], at the French Institute in Milan. : Footnote 3,  18.12.1968, pp. 51-59.  :  On Psychoanalysis in its Relationships to Reality (Milan) : 18th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan or here 

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p10  :  Lacan refers to as “my antecedents”  :  possibly a reference to On my antecedents: 1966? : Jacques Lacan : p51-57 of Bruce Fink’s translation of the Écrits.  Copy available from Julia Evans.   See Écrits : 1966 : Jacques Lacan : See here  

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p10  :  Indeed, during this period which preceded the Rome Discourse,  Footnote 4, J. Lacan, “Function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis”, Report to the Rome Congress… 1953, Écrits, English edition, pp. 30-113. :  See The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis (Rome) : 26th September 1953 : Jacques Lacan  or here  http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=11831  &  Rome Discourses – to introduce his report (Rome) : 26th September 1953 : Jacques Lacan  or here  

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p11  :  seminar Encore (you know how late it appeared in the teaching of Lacan), you will find the following: Speaking of the body he says: “the important thing is that it all sticks together sufficiently for the body to subsist, unless there is an accident as one might say, whether external or internal. Which means that the body is taken to be what it presents itself as being: a closed body.”  Footnote 5  J. Lacan, Seminar XX, Encore, 1972-1973, p. 100.  : See     Seminar XX  8th May 1973 :  See Seminar XX : Encore 1972 – 1973 (from 21st November 1972) : Jacques Lacan or here  : pXI 8 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : In other words, the important thing is that all of that sticks together sufficiently for the body to subsist, barring any accident as they say, external or internal; which (8) means that the body is taken for what it presents itself to be: a closed body, as they say. 

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p11 :  In order for the organic individuality to become a body, Lacan says that it is necessary for the signifier to introduce the One.  :  Probably Seminar XX  or  Seminar XI :  This is near,  Seminar XX : 26th June 1973  :  See Seminar XX : Encore 1972 – 1973 (from 21st November 1972) : Jacques Lacan or here  :  pVIII 10 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : The body, what is it then? Is it or is it not the knowledge of the One? 

The knowledge of the One is revealed as not coming from the body. The knowledge of the One, for the little that we can say about it, the knowledge of the One comes from the signifier One. 

NOTE : there is also a reference to biology on this page

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p 13    It’s because the Symbolic is in a certain way a body, having materiality, that there is – as Lacan points out explicitly in the Seminar on the Four Discourses  :  Footnote 6  J. Lacan, Séminaire XVII, L’Envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970. :   See Seminar XVII: Psychoanalysis upside down/The reverse side of psychoanalysis: 1969-1970 : from 26th November 1969: Jacques Lacan or here  : Seminar XVII  18th February 1970 : pVII 3 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : what has in effect  been lived by the one who well merits on this occasion the title of ‘patient’, should not make us forget  that because of signifying  links the subjective configuration has an objectivity that can be perfectly well mapped out and grounds the very possibility of the help that we contribute in the form of interpretation. Here, at a particular point of the linkage, specifically the altogether initial one, between S1 to S2,  it is possible that there opens up this fault which is called the subject. Here linkage-effects, in this case signifying ones, are brought into operation.   Whether this lived experience that is called more or less properly thinking is or is not produced somewhere, there, here produced something that is due to a chain, exactly as if it came from thinking. Freud never said anything else when he spoke about the unconscious. This objectivity (3) not only induces but determines this position, which is a subject position, in so far as it is the focus of what are called defences.

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p13  language is [a] body, “a subtle body, for sure, but a body nonetheless.”  :  Footnote 7  J. Lacan, “Function and field of speech and language”, Écrits, p. 301, French edition. :  See The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis (Rome) : 26th September 1953 : Jacques Lacan  or here    &  Rome Discourses – to introduce his report (Rome) : 26th September 1953 : Jacques Lacan  or here  :  p64 of Anthony Wilden’s translation : The Word is in fact a gift of Language, and Language is not immaterial. It is a subtle body, but body it is. Words are trapped in all the corporeal images which captivate the subject; they can make the hysteric pregnant, be identified with the object of penis-neid, represent the flood of urine of urethral ambition, or the retained faeces of avaricious jouissance.

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Footnote 8 :  In “Radiophonie” there is an entire page devoted to this question of the body  : See Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here  :    Question II p4 -5of Jack W. Stone’s translation :

Following structure is to assure oneself of the effect of language.

This is only done in putting aside the petition of principle that it reproduces from relations taken at the real. At the real to be understood from my category.

For these relations also make a part of reality inasmuch as they inhabit it in formulas that are also present there. Structure is captured from there.

From there, this is to say from the point where the symbolic takes body. I am going to return to this: body.

It would be astonishing that one not see that in making language a function of the collective, one returns always to supposing someone, thanks to whom reality is redoubled in that he represents it, so that we no longer have to do more than reproduce this lining: in brief, in the wasp nest of idealism.

I will come at the end to someone who is not of this vintage: someone to make a sign of it (quelqu’un à lui faire signe).

I return first to the body of the symbolic that must be understood as not at all metaphorical. As is shown by the fact that nothing isolates the body to be taken in the naïve sense, that in which the being sustained by it does not know that language is what discerns it for him, to the point that it would not be there if it were not able to be spoken of.

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Footnote 9 :  In “Radiophonie” “The first body makes the second by embodying itself” : See Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here  :  Question II p5 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : The first body makes the second from incorporating itself there.

Whence the incorporeal that remains to mark the first, from the time after its incorporation. Let us render justice to the stoics for having known with this term: the incorporeal, to sign how the symbolic holds to the body.

Incorporeal is the function, which makes a reality from mathematics, the application of a same effect for topology, or analysis in a broad sense for logic.

But it is incorporated that structure makes affect, neither more nor less, affect only to be taken from what is articulated of being, only having there a de facto being, that is, from being said from somewhere.

By which it is affirmed of the body that it is second whether it be dead or alive.

Who does not know the critical point from which we date in man the speaking being: the sepulcher is where, in a fashion, it is affirmed that contrary to any other, the dead body keeps what gave the living its character: body. A Corpse [in English] remains, does not become carrion, the body that speech inhabited, that language corpsified.

Zoology can take its departure from the pretension of the individual to make being from the living, but this is so that it might fold back on it, only if Zoology pursue it at the level of the polyper.

The body, to take it seriously, is to start with what can carry the mark proper to range it in a sequence of signifiers. Starting from this mark, it is a support, not potential (éventuel), but necessary, of a relation, for it is still to support it to subtract itself from it.

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p14  And that which justifies us in saying “I have a body” – to take our body as an attribute instead of taking it as our very being – is, if I may put it that way, that we, as subjects, can do without it. : Two possible references :

See Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: 1954-1955: begins 17th November 1954 : Jacques Lacan or here : Seminar II 12th January 1955 :    p72 Sylvana Tomaselli’s translation : It is very odd to say, there’s a truly strange incoherence in saying – man has a body. For us it makes sense, it is even probable that it has always made sense, but it makes more sense for us than for anybody else, since, with Hegel and without knowing it, in so far as everybody is Hegelian without knowing it. we have pushed to ) an extreme degree the identification of man with his knowledge. which is an accumulated knowledge. It is very strange to be localised in a body, and this strangeness can’t be minimised, despite the fact that a great deal of time is spent puffing ourselves up and boasting about having reinvented human unity, which that idiot Descartes had cut in two. It is completely useless to make great declarations about returning to the unity of the human being, to the soul as the body’s form, with large dosages of Thomism and Aristotelianism. The division is here to stay. And that is why physicians of our day and age’ aren’t the physicians of other times, except those who spend their time convinced that there are temperaments. constitutions, and other things of that sort. The physician has with respect to the body the attitude of the man who dismantles a machine. All statements of principles notwithstanding, this attitude is a radical one. That’s the point where Freud started. and that was his ideal – to do pathological anatomy, anatomical physiology. to discover what this little-complicated apparatus embodied there in the nervous system is for.

This perspective, which splits the unity of the living, certainly does have something of a disturbing, scandalous aspect, and one entire line of thought tries to counter it – I’m thinking of gestaltism and other well intentioned theoretical elaborations, which hope to return to the benevolence of nature and to a pre-established harmony. Of course, nothing proves that the body is a machine, and in fact there’s every chance that it isn’t. But that isn’t the problem. The important thing is that this is the way in which one has tackled the question. I named him just now. the one in question, it’s Descartes. He wasn’t the only one. for it took quite a bit for him to begin to think of the body as a machine. What in particular it took was for there to be one which not only worked by itself. but which could embody in a quite striking way something essentially human. 

See  Seminar XXIII: The Sinthome or Joyce and the Sinthome: 1975-1976: beginning on November 18th 1975 : Jacques Lacan or here  :  Seminar XXIII, 11th May 1976   ; pXI 11  Cormac Gallagher’s translation  :  And this disgust concerns his [Joyce’s] own body in short. It is like someone who puts in parenthesis, who drives away the bad memory. This is what is at stake. This is altogether left as a possibility; as a possibility of the relationship to his own body as foreign.

And this indeed is what is expressed by the fact of using the verb ‘to have’. One has one’s body, one is not it to any degree. And this is what leads to belief in the soul. As a consequence of which there is no reason to stop there. And one also believes that one has a soul, which crowns it all. This form of letting drop, of letting drop the relationship to one’s own body, is very suspect for an analyst. This idea of self, of self as body has something weighty about it. This is what is called the ego. If the ego is said to be narcissistic, it is indeed because there is something at a certain level which supports the body as image. But in the case of Joyce is the fact that this image, on this occasion is not involved, is this not what marks that on this occasion the ego has a quite particular function. How can that be written in, in my noeud bo

See  Jacques Lacan’s sayings excavated by Julia Evans on 17th October 2020 or  here 

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p15  And fundamentally, the signifier, it has to be said, is like Schreber’s God. Schreber’s God did not know the living, nor does the signifier. Lacan frequently evoked the effect of devitalisation. : See  Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here  : Seminar III  11th January 1956 : p69 of Russell Grigg’s translation :  Ultimately God only has a complete, authentic relationship with corpses. God doesn’t understand anything of living beings, his omnipresence grasps things only from the outside, never from the inside. Here we have propositions that don’t appear to be self-evident or demanded by the coherence of the system, such as we ourselves might conceive it in advance.  

We shall have to structure the relationship between what guarantees the real in the other, that is, the presence and existence of the stable world of God, and Schreber the subject qua organic reality and fragmented body.

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p15  We could also evoke Descartes here, who, with his Cogito, was, if we can use such a term, the promoter of the subject. Well, Descartes, essentially, shows one thing: namely, that life is unthinkable.  :  See Seminar I: Freud’s papers on technique: 1953-1954 : begins on 18th November 1953 : Jacques Lacan or here :  Seminar I 7th July 1954  : p276 of John Forrester’s translation : One wants to be loved for everything – not only for one’s ego, as Descartes says, but for the colour of one’s hair, for one’s idiosyncracies, for one’s weaknesses, for everything. 

But inversely, and I would say correlatively, as a result of exactly that, to love is to love a being beyond what he or she appears to be. The active gift of love is directed at the other, not in his specificity, but in his being. 

0. MANNONI: It was Pascal who said that, not Descartes. 

There is a passage in Descartes on the progressive purification of the ego beyond all its specific qualities. But you aren’t wrong, in so far as Pascal tries to take us beyond the creature. 

0. MANNONI: He said it explicitly. 

Yes, but it was a gesture of rejection.
Love, now no longer conceived of as a passion but as an active gift, is always directed, beyond imaginary captivation, towards the being of the loved subject, towards his particularity. 

& see Seminar II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: 1954-1955: begins 17th November 1954 : Jacques Lacan or here : Seminar II 24th November 1954 : p6 of Sylvana Tomaselli’s translation : Look at the literature. You say that that’s the job of those who think, but those who don’t think must always have had, more or less spontaneously, some notion of the ego. What makes you so sure? You, in any case, belong with those who think, or at least you are following on after people who have thought about it. So, let’s try to open the question, rather than settling it so unthinkingly.

The type of people that we shall define, using a conventional notation, as dentists are very confident about the order of the universe because they think that Mr Descartes made manifest the laws and the procedures of limpid reason in the Discourse on Method. His I think, therefore, I am, so essential to the new subjectivity, is not as simple, however, as it would appear to these dentists, and some even think they detect in it a pure and simple sleight of hand, If it is in fact true that consciousness is transparent to itself, and grasps itself as such, it does seem that the I is not on that account transparent to it. It is not given to it as different from an object. The apprehension of an object by consciousness does not by the same token reveal to it its properties. The same is true for the I.

If this I is in fact presented to us as a kind of immediate given in the act of reflection by which consciousness grasps itself as transparent to itself, for all that, nothing indicates that the whole of this reality – and it is granting quite a bit already to say that we come to a judgement of existence l – would be exhausted by this.  [Footnote 1, See Freud. ‘Negation’ (l925h) GW XIV 1 1-15: Stud III 373-7: SE XIX 235-9]

& see Science and Truth: 1st December 1965 session of Seminar XIII: The Object of Psychoanalysis : Jacques Lacan or here : p5 of Bruce Fink’s translation : I did not thus just make an immediate pronouncement concerning psychoanalysis’ vocation as a science. But it might have been noticed that I took my lead last year from a certain moment of the subject that I consider to be an essential correlate of science, a historically defined moment, the strict repeatability in experience of which perhaps remains to be determined: the moment Descartes inaugurates that goes by the name of cogito.

This correlate, as a moment, is the aftermath [défilé] of a rejection of all knowledge, but is nevertheless claimed to establish for the subject a certain anchoring in being; I sustain that this anchoring constitutes the definition of the subject of science, “definition” to be understood in the sense of a “narrow doorway”. 

This lead did not guide me in vain, for it led me at year end to formulate our experienced division as subjects as a division between knowledge and truth, and to accompany it with a topological model, the Mobius strip; this strip conveys the fact that the division in which these two terms come together is not to be derived from a difference in origin. 

& there are many other references in the Écrits, Seminar VII, etc

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p16  it seems to me, a double connotation. On the one hand, of belonging, belonging to a set; and on the other hand, an erotic quality. And there is a whole range of phenomena to think about. Just think of the things Lacan evokes, such as tattoos, tattoos that both identify you and make of you an erotic object – in some societies, anyway.  : See Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts: 1963-1964 : beginning 15th January 1964 : Jacques Lacan or here :  Seminar XI  26th February 1964 : p87 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : What is at issue in geometral perspective is simply the mapping of space, not sight. The blind man may perfectly well conceive that the field of space that he knows, and which he knows as real, may be perceived at a distance, and as a simultaneous act. For him, it is a question of apprehending a temporal function, instantaneity. In Descartes, dioptrics, the action of the eyes, is represented as the conjugated action of two sticks. The geometral dimension of vision does not exhaust, therefore, far from it, what the field of vision as such offers us as the original subjectifying relation.

p87-88 : I will go so far as to say that this fascination complements what geometral researches into perspective allow to escape from vision.

How is it that nobody has ever thought of connecting this with. … the effect of an erection? Imagine a tattoo traced on the sexual organ ad hoc in the state of repose and assuming it’s, if I may say so, developed form in another state.

How can we not see here, immanent in the geometral dimension—a partial dimension in the field of the gaze, a dimension that has nothing to do with vision as such—something symbolic of the function of the lack, of the appearance of the phallic ghost?

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p16  Footnote 10 That is what Lacan formulates in different ways when he says, “the body makes the bed of the other.”  :  J. Lacan, “De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité”, Scilicet 1p. 58: “Tiers ‘au-delà’ dans ses rapports à la jouissance et au savoir, Ie corps fait Ie lit de I’autre par l’opération du signifiant.”  :  See On Psychoanalysis in its Relationships to Reality (Milan) : 18th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan or here :  p10 of Scott Savaiano’s translation : This is a chance to remind us of what there is between them, in the presence of the body, that establishes itself as disjunctive junction. The strange thing is that to which the body reduces itself in this economy. So profoundly misrecognized by Descartes that he reduces it to being mere extension, it would require that the imminent excesses of our surgery be applied to it in order to lay out for all to see that we dispose of it only in rendering it into its proper pieces, only insofar as it is dislodged from its jouissance. [JE adds The] Third “beyond” in relation [JE notes rapports = relationship] to jouissance and to knowledge, the body makes the bed of the Other through the operation of the signifier. 

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p17 Footnote 10 :  … makes the bed of the other.”  See also : J. Lacan, “De l’Un-en-moins, le lit est fait l’intrusion qui avance de l’extrusion: c’est le significant même” : Radiophonie Scilicet 2/3 p61 : See Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here : p5 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : The body, to take it seriously, is to start with what can carry the mark proper to range it in a sequence of signifiers. Starting from this mark, it is a support, not potential (éventuel), but necessary, of a relation, for it is still to support it to subtract itself from it. 

From before any date, Minus-One designates the place of the Other (Autre) (with the sigla big A) for Lacan. From the One-Short (Un-en-Moins), the bed is made for the intrusion that advances from the extrusion; this is the signifier itself. 

Not all fleshes go this way. From those alone that imprint the sign to negativize themselves, mount, in that bodies are separated from them, the clouds, the (p62) upper waters, of their jouissance, heavy with thunders to redistribute body and flesh.

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p17 Footnote 11 : that the body functions as a fragmented body. In “L’Etourdit”, Lacan insists on the fact that it is because the body inhabits language 11.  J. Lacan, “L’Etourdit”, Scilicet 4, pp. 5-51; see particularly p. 12 and p. 30. : See L’Étourdit: 14th July 1972 : Jacques Lacan or here  :  Possibly p28 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : This dire only proceeds from the fact that the unconscious, from being structured like a language, which is to say thelanguage (lalangue) it inhabits, is subjected to the equivoque by which each is distinguished. A language among others is nothing more than the integral of the equivoques that its history has let persist. This is the vein by which the real, the only one for analytic discourse to motivate its issue, the real that there is no sexual rapport, has made a deposit there in the course of ages. This in the currency (espèce) that this real introduces to the one, that is, to the unique of the body which from it takes an organ, and from this fact makes organs distanced by a disjunction whereby without doubt other organs come into its reach, but not without the quadruple path of these accesses infinitizing themselves inasmuch as is produced there the “real number.” 

The language then, insofar as this currency has its place in it, makes an effect there from nothing other than the structure from which is motivated this incidence of the real. 

All that appears-is (parest) in it of a semblant of communication is always dream, lapsus, or joke. 

****

p17  that is, “anatomy is destiny”. (S. Freud, “The dissolution of the Oedipus complex”) : See On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love (Contributions to the Psychology of Love II) : 1912 :  Sigmund Freud, SE XI  &/or  The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex : 1924d : Sigmund Freud, SE XIX p173-179,  Published at www.Freud2Lacan.com see here 

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p18 in “L’Etourdit”, is to say that sex is not anatomical. He is saying that man or woman is an affair of the subject and it depends on the way in which each individual inscribes him/herself within the phallic function. : See L’Étourdit: 14th July 1972 : Jacques Lacan or here :  p5 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : But of what is it a question? Of the rapport between the man and the woman insofar precisely as they would be proper, in that they inhabit language, to make stated this rapport.
Is it the absence of this rapport that exiles them in their stabitat? Is it to labitate that this rapport can only be inter-dit (inter-dicted, or said-between [tr.])? 

****

p18 And it has to be said that the increase, not only of those we call transsexuals but, correlatively, of surgical procedures for transsexuals, which consist of operating on them, I would say, really, makes of this Lacanian thesis, which, at the outset may seem startling, a phenomenon. The choice of one’s sex is not a function of anatomy. 

:  I have recently read a reference to surgical procedures for transsexuals & I cannot now refind it.

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p18  Lacan completely displaces these formulae in the later years, especially in “On psychoanalysis and its relations to reality”, “Radiophonie”, Télévision, and L’Etourdit. 

: See Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here   http://www.lacanianworks.net/?p=756 , Television: 31st January 1974 : Jacques Lacan or here,  & L’Étourdit: 14th July 1972 : Jacques Lacan or here  

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p19  Footnote 12  First of all, “The subject is happy”. That’s in Télévision.12 J. Lacan, Télévision, Paris, Le Seuil, 1974, p. 40. : See Television: 31st January 1974 : Jacques Lacan or here : p26-27 of Denis Hollier’s translation, published in October : Where in all this is what makes for good luck [bon heur]?11 Strictly speaking everywhere. The subject is happy-go-lucky [heureux]. It is his very definition since he can owe nothing if not to luck, to fortune in other words, and any piece of luck is good as something to maintain him, insofar as it repeats itself.

What is astonishing is not that he is happy without suspecting what reduces him to this state- his dependence on the structure-but that he gets an idea of beatitude, an idea which is forceful enough for him to feel himself exiled from it.

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p19 “Ou pire”, which dates from the year when he was giving a seminar called Ou pire, in which Lacan developed, very didactically, the statement that unconscious knowledge affects, without any doubt. “But what? That is the question where people make mistakes. Not my subject, nor the soul, either… Me, I say that knowledge affects the body of the being who only makes himself a being of speech, in fragmenting his jouissance…”  Footnote 13 J. Lacan, “Ou pire”, Scilicet 5, p. 8. : See Seminar XIX: 1971-72: …Ou pire …Or worse : from 8th December 1971 : Jacques Lacan or here   : Scilicet is mentioned in Seminar XIX 21st June 1972 & this is probably from Account (Summary) of Seminar XIX -… Or worse : July 1973 : Jacques Lacan or here  : p6 of www.Freud2Lacan.com publication, translator unknown : But what? It’s the question where one makes a mistake. 

Not “my” subject (the one that I said a moment ago: that it is constituted in its semblant, I was saying its letter).

‐‐Nor the soul, what the imbeciles imagine, at least that’s what they let us believe, when one finds by reading them that soul with which man thinks, for Aristotle, the soul that a Uexküll reconstructs, in the guise of an Innenwelt, which of the Umwelt is the exact portrait.

say that knowledge affects the body of the being who is made being only from words, this from parcelling out his jouissance, by cutting it into pieces through that in order to produce falls from which I make the (a), to be read object little , or even abject, which will be said that way when I am dead, a time when at last I will be heard, or again the (a) first cause of his desire. 

This body is not the nervous system, even though this system serves jouissance in as much as in the body it sets up predation or, better, the jouissance of the Umwelt taken as a form of prey – which from the Umwelt therefore does not figure the trait‐for‐trait, as one persists in framing it from a residue of a philosophical wake, whose translation as “affect” marks the non‐analysed. 

****

p19 Footnote 14  Seminar Encore. Lacan says: “in order to jouir, there has to be a 

body.” J. Lacan, Encore, p. 26 [“a body is there to be enjoyed”] : See Seminar XX : Encore 1972 – 1973 (from 21st November 1972) : Jacques Lacan or here   : Seminar XX 19th December 1972 : pIII 15 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : Is this not what is supposed properly and precisely by this all which the analytic experience signifies here.

Substance of the body, on condition that it is defined only as what enjoys itself. Only property of the living body, no doubt, but we do not know what living being is except uniquely in the fact that a body for its part enjoys. And what is more : we fall immediately on the fact that it only enjoys itself from corporalising (corporiser) it in a signifying way.

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p19 Footnote 15 “the body is the desert of jouissance”, and “jouissance is outside the body” J. Lacan: “On psychoanalysis and its relations with reality”, Scilicet 1, p. 58. :  See On Psychoanalysis in its Relationships to Reality (Milan) : 18th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan or here : p10-11 of Scott Savaiano’s translation : Thus it is from jouissance that truth is found to resist knowledge. This is what psychoanalysis discovers in that which it calls symptom – truth that makes full use of the disparagement of reason. We, psychoanalysts, know that the truth is that satisfaction not obviated by pleasure except as it exiles itself to the desert of jouissance. Without a doubt the masochist knows how to call this jouissance back from the desert, but does so merely to show (precisely to reach it only so as to excite a demonstrative figure with his simulation) that he is in it an “all” (tous – why not “tout”?) of the body, precisely that he is this desert. 

NOTE : it has not been possible to find the second quote.  This may be that this is a translation of the re-edited text which appears in Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan or here  rather than the Scilicet version

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p19 Footnote 16 “in defining it according to relations articulated by their order, and such that, in taking part in it, one can only do so at one’s own expense.” J. Lacan: “Radiophonie”, Scilicet 2/3, p. 86. :  Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here  :  p21-22 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : And if this is the case, we rediscover the structure that is the wall of which we speak.

In defining it from relations articulated from their order, and such that in taking part there, one only does it at one’s own expense.

Expense of life or else of death. Expense of jouissance, that’s the main thing (voilà le primaire

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p19 Footnote 17 “Expense of life instead of death, is secondary; expense [expenditure] of jouissance, that is what is primary. Whence the necessity of the plus-de-jouir in order for the machine to turn.” J. Lacan: “Radiophonie”, Scilicet 2/3, p. 86. : See Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here : p22 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : Expense of life or else of death. Expense of jouissance, that’s the main thing (voilà le primaire

Whence the necessity of the surplus enjoyment (plus-de-jouir) for the mechanism to turn, jouissance only indicating itself there so that one might have it from this effacing (effaçon), as a hole to fill.

Do not be astonished that I pause (ressasse) here when ordinarily I hurry along my path. 

(87) It is that in remaking here an inaugural cut, I am not repeating it, I am showing it doubling to gather what falls from it. 

****

p20 Footnote 18 : “what it is about for everyone, where the body is concerned, that it should be precisely this desert of jouissance.” J. Lacan: “De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la realité”, Scilicet 1, p. 58. : See On Psychoanalysis in its Relationships to Reality (Milan) : 18th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan or here : p11 of Scott Savaiano’s translation : Without a doubt the masochist knows how to call this jouissance back from the desert, but does so merely to show (precisely to reach it only so as to excite a demonstrative figure with his simulation) that he is in it an “all” (tous – why not “tout”?) of the body, precisely that he is this desert. 

Reality, given this, is controlled by fantasy insofar as the subject produces (se réalise) himself through it in his very division.

****

p20 Footnote 19 : says in “Kant with Sade”, or the unbroken agreement between the creature and its life. J. Lacan, “Kant avec Sade”, Écrits, p. 766. : See Kant with Sade: April 1963: Jacques Lacan  or here : This is the nearest – from 1st page of James B. Swenson’s translation : If Freud was able to enunciate hispleasure principle without even having to worry about marking what distinguishes it from its function in traditional ethics, even without risking that it should be heard as an echo of the uncontested prejudice of two millenia, to recall the attraction which preordains the creature to its good, along with the psychology inscribed in various myths of goodwill, we can only credit this to the insinuating rise across the nineteenth century of the theme of “happiness in evil.”   

****

p21 Footnote 20 : what Freud has let out of the bag is precisely the inverse of that; it is that

one can be well in the midst of evil, to take up again the formula of “Kant with Sade”  In Sade’s own words “Quel paradis dans cet enfer” [ed.]

****

p21 Footnote 21 : basically, that there is another satisfaction than that given by equilibrium, by homeostasis J. Lacan, “Kant avec Sade”, Écrits, p. 766. : p61 of James B. Swenson’s translation : See Kant with Sade: April 1963: Jacques Lacan  or here : Probably – Because it sets forth submitted to pleasure, whose law is to turn it always too short in its aim. A homeostasis which is always too quickly recovered by the living being at the lowest threshold of the tension upon which it subsists.

***

p21 : “what it entails in the way of atrocious promises”. It has always made me laugh, this “what the approach of jouissance entails of atrocious promises” : See Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts: 1963-1964 : beginning 15th January 1964 : Jacques Lacan or here : Seminar XI  10th June 1964, p234 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : Who does not know from experience that it is possible not to want to ejaculate? Who does not know from experience, knowing the recoil imposed on everyone, in so far as it involves terrible promises, by the approach of jouissance as such? Who does not know that one may not wish to think?—the entire universal college of professors is there as evidence. 

But what does not wanting to desire mean?

****

p21 Pleasure is what he calls: the incoherent binding of life, :  See ‘The Subversion of the subject and the Dialetic of Desire: 19th to 23rd September 1960: Jacques Lacan  or here  : p319 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : But it is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance – rather it creates out of an almost natural barrier a barred subject. For it is pleasure that sets the limits on jouissance, pleasure as that which binds incoherent life together, until another, unchallengeable prohibition arises from the regulation that Freud discovered as the primary process and appropriate law of pleasure.

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p21 Footnote 22 : Yet this first barrier, which is a natural one, he says, fundamentally comes to be relayed for humans through a prohibition, by means of the law.  cf. J. Lacan, “Subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious”, Écrits, p. 821, French edition. : See ‘The Subversion of the subject and the Dialetic of Desire: 19th to 23rd September 1960: Jacques Lacan  or here  : p319 of Alan Sheridan’s translation : But we must insist that jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks as such, although it can only be said between the lines for whoever is subject of the Law, since the Law is grounded in this very prohibition.

Indeed, the Law appears to be giving the order, ‘Jouis!’, to which the subject can only reply ‘j’ouis’ (I hear), the jouissance being no more than understood.

But it is not the Law itself that bars the subject’s access to jouissance – rather it creates out of an almost natural barrier a barred subject. For it is pleasure that sets the limits on jouissance, pleasure as that which binds incoherent life together, until another, unchallengeable prohibition arises from the regulation that Freud discovered as the primary process and appropriate law of pleasure.

It has been said that in this discovery Freud merely followed the course already being pursued by the science of his time, indeed, that it belonged to a long-standing tradition. To appreciate the true audacity of his step, we have only to consider his recompense, which was not slow in coming : failure over the heteroclite nature of the castration complex.

It is only indication of that jouissance of its infinitude that brings with it the mark of its prohibition, and, in order to constitute that mark, involves a sacrifice : that which is made in one and the same act with the choice of its symbol, the phallus.

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p22 unless you hold on to the vital principle that, for Lacan, desire, in essence, is to be unsatisfied, that is to say, desire has no object which responds to its aspiration. : Possibly The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power:10th-13th July 1958 : Jacques Lacan       or here  : p41 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : since Freud situates it as the desire to have an unsatisfied desire. :

&/or p62 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation – That he sustains as subject‘ means that language allows him to regard himself as the scene-shifter, or even the director of the entire imaginary capture of which he would otherwise be nothing more than the living marionette. Phantasy is the perfect illustration of this original possibility. That is why any attempt to reduce it to imagination, failing to admit its failure, is a permanent misconception, a misconception from which the Kleinian school which has certainly carried things very far here, is not free, because it has been incapable of even so much as suspecting the existence of the category of signifier.

However, once it is defined as an image set to work in the signifying structure, the notion of unconscious phantasy no longer presents any difficulty.

Let us say that in its fundamental use phantasy it that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing in so far as the very satisfaction of demand robs him of its object.

& Presentation on Psychical Causality : 28th September 1946 : Jacques Lacan : Available at www.LacanianWorksExchange.net  /lacan  : See Écrits : 1966 : Jacques Lacan or here  : p148 of Bruce Fink’s translation : Thus, and this is an essential point, the first effect of the imago that appears  in human beings is that of the subject’s alienation. It is in the other that the subject first identifies himself and even experiences himself. This phenomenon will seem less surprising if we recall the fundamental social conditions of the human Umwelt and if we evoke the intuition that dominates all of Hegel’s speculations.

Man’s very desire is constituted, he tells us, under the sign of mediation: it is the desire to have one’s desire recognized. Its object is a desire, that of other people, in the sense that man has no object that is constituted for his desire without some mediation. This is clear from his earliest needs, in that, for example his very food must be prepared; and we find this anew in the whole development of his satisfaction, beginning with the conflict between master and slave, through the entire dialectic of labor.

This dialectic, which is that of man’s very being, must bring about, through a series of crises, the synthesis of his particularity and his universality, going so far as to universalize this very particularity.

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p22 There is another way one can oppose the dog to the cat. Lacan goes as far as dreaming of the lily of the fields. Does the plant have jouissance?  :   See Seminar XVII: Psychoanalysis upside down/The reverse side of psychoanalysis: 1969-1970 : from 26th November 1969: Jacques Lacan or here : Seminar XVII 17th June 1970 : pXV 110 to XV 111 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : It is a question of articulating what is involved in this phallic exclusion in the great human game of our tradition, which is that of desire. Desire has no immediately proximate relationship to this field. Our tradition posits it as what it is, Eros, the making present of lack. It is here that one can ask – how can one desire anything at all? What is lacking? There is someone who one day said – do not tire yourselves out, there is nothing lacking, see the lilies of the fields, they sew not, neither do they spin, but they have their place in the kingdom of heaven. It is obvious that to put forward such challenging proposals, you would really have to be the very one who identified with the negation of this harmony. This at least is how he has been understood, interpreted, when he was described as the Word (le Verbe). He had to be the Word itself to deny what was as obvious as this. Anyway, this is the idea that people had of him. He did not say as much. He said, if we are to believe one of his disciples – I am the way, the truth and the life. But that he was made into the Word, is what clearly marks that people knew all the same more or less what they were saying when they thought that only the Word could disavow himself to this extent. It is true that we can well imagine the lilies in the fields as a body entirely given over to enjoyment. Every step of its growth identical to a formless sensation. The enjoyment of a plant. Nothing in any case allows us to escape it. It is perhaps infinitely painful to be a plant. Anyway, no one amuses themselves dreaming about that, except me.

It is not the same thing for an animal, which has what we interpret as an economy – the possibility of moving around in order to obtain the minimum of enjoyment.

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p22 Freud, too, dreamed of a jouissance that would not be encroached upon by the signifier. Just look at the passage in his text “On Narcissism, an introduction”, the short and very amusing passage where he sets up a series: the child, the cat and the woman, or rather certain types of women, not woman in general. : See On Narcissism – an Introduction : March 1914 : Sigmund Freud or here : Translated by James Strachey SE XIV p88-90 : This sexual overvaluation is the origin of the peculiar state of being in love, a state suggestive of a neurotic compulsion, which is thus traceable to an impoverishment of the ego as regards libido in favour of the love-object. [p88 Footnote 1 Freud returned to this in a discussion of being in love in Chapter VIII of his Group Psychology (1921) Sigmund Freud, SE XVIII p69-143 : published by www.Freud2Lacan.com  : See  here ] A different course is followed in the type of female most frequently met with, which is probably the purest and truest one. With the onset of puberty the maturing of the female sexual organs, which up till then have been in a condition of latency, seems to bring about an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is unfavourable to the development of a true object-choice with its accompanying sexual overvaluation. Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of object. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man’s love for them. Nor does their need lie in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfils this condition is the one who finds favour with them. The importance of this type of woman for the erotic life of mankind is to be rated very high. Such women have the greatest fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule they are the most beautiful, but also because of a combination of interesting psychological factors. For it seems very evident that another person’s narcissism has a great attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and are in search of object-love. The charm of a child lies to a great extent in his narcissism, his self-contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and the large beasts of prey. Indeed, even great criminals and humorists, as they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it. It is as if we envied them for maintaining a blissful state of mind – an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have since abandoned. The great charm of narcissistic women has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover’s dissatisfaction, of his doubts of the woman’s love, of his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its root in this incongruity between the types of object-choice.

Perhaps it is not out of place here to give an assurance that this description of the feminine form of erotic life is not due to any tendentious desire on my part to depreciate women. Apart from the fact that tendentiousness is quite alien to me, I know that these different lines of development correspond to the differentiation of functions in a highly complicated biological whole; further, I am ready to admit that there are quite a number of women who love according to the masculine and who also develop the sexual overvaluation proper to that type.

Even for narcissistic women, whose attitude towards men remains cool, there is a road which leads to complete object-love. In the child which they bear, a part of their own body

confronts them like an extraneous object, to which, starting out from their narcissism, they can then give complete object-love. There are other women, again, who do not have to wait for a child in order to take the step in development from (secondary) narcissism to object-love. Before puberty they feel masculine and develop some way along masculine lines; after this trend has been cut short on their reaching female maturity, they still retain the capacity of longing for a masculine ideal – an ideal which is in fact a survival of the boyish nature that they themselves once possessed. [p90 Footnote 1,  Freud developed his views on female sexuality in a number of later papers: On a case of female homosexuality (1920a) {The Psychogenesis of a case of Homosexuality in a Woman: 1920: Sigmund Freud or here, SE XVIII p145-172} , On the effects of the anatomical distinction between the sexes (1925j) { SE XIX p241-258.  Published bilingual by www.Freud2Lacan.com, at here }, On the sexuality of women (1931b) { SE XXI p221-243  : Published at www.Freud2Lacan.net download here }, and in Lecture XXXIII ‘Femininity’ of his New Introductory Lectures (1933a),{ SE XXII p112-135 Published www.Freud2Lacan.com , download here }]

p23 Footnote 23 “one gets the idea of beatitude”, J. Lacan, Télévision, p. 40. : See Television: 31st January 1974 : Jacques Lacan or here : p26-27 of Denis Hollier’s translation, published in October : Where in all this is what makes for good luck [bon heur]?11 Strictly speaking everywhere. The subject is happy-go-lucky [heureux]. It is his very definition since he can owe nothing if not to luck, to fortune in other words, and any piece of luck is good as something to maintain him, insofar as it repeats itself.

What is astonishing is not that he is happy without suspecting what reduces him to this state- his dependence on the structure-but that he gets an idea of beatitude, an idea which is forceful enough for him to feel himself exiled from it.

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p24 Footnote 24 : in the text called “Psychoanalysis and its relation to reality”, where we find the expression “desert of jouissance”. J. Lacan, “De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la réalité”, Scilicet 1, p. 58. : See On Psychoanalysis in its Relationships to Reality (Milan) : 18th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan or here : p10-11 of Scott Savaiano’s translation : Thus it is from jouissance that truth is found to resist knowledge. This is what psychoanalysis discovers in that which it calls symptom – truth that makes full use of the disparagement of reason. We, psychoanalysts, know that the truth is that satisfaction not obviated by pleasure except as it exiles itself to the desert of jouissance. Without a doubt the masochist knows how to call this jouissance back from the desert, but does so merely to show (precisely to reach it only so as to excite a demonstrative figure with his simulation) that he is in it an “all” (tous – why not “tout”?) of the body, precisely that he is this desert.

****

p24 Footnote 25 : which he describes to us as traces in the psychic apparatuses. S. Freud, “Outline for a scientific psychology”, 1895, The birth of psychoanalysis, Paris, PUP, 1969, p. 307. : See The Project for a Scientific Psychology: 23rd & 25th September & 5th October 1895: Sigmund Freud  or here : Possibly Section [9] The Functioning of the Apparatus,  SE I p312   or probably Part I, Section [18] Thought & Reality, SE1 p335 or p397 of ‘The Origins of Psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud’s Letters’ : Thought must further satisfy another condition. It must make no essential change in the facilitations laid down by the primary processes, or otherwise it would falsify the traces of reality. It is enough to say of this condition that facilitation is probably the result of the single passage of a major quantity, and that cathexis, though very powerful at the moment, leaves behind it no comparably lasting effect. The small quantities (8) that pass during thought-processes cannot in general prevail over the facilitations.

Nevertheless there can be no doubt that thought-processes do leave permanent traces; since thinking something over a second time demands so much less effort than the first time. Therefore, in order that reality may not be falsified, there must be special traces(indications of thought-processes)which constitute a “thought-memory”- something which it has not so far been possible to formulate. We shall hear presently of the means by which traces of thought-processes are distinguished from traces of reality.

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p25 Footnote 26 : “the first ideal marks in which the drives are constituted as repressed, in the substitution of the signifier for needs.” J. Lacan, “The direction of the treatment”, Écrits, p. 256, English edition. : See The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power:10th-13th July 1958 : Jacques Lacan  or here  : p40 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation : Hence the oscillation to be observed in Freud‘s statements on the relations between the superego and reality. The superego is not of course, the source of reality, as he says somewhere, but it traces out its paths, before rediscovering in the unconscious the first ideal marks in which the tendencies are constituted as repressed by the substitution of the signifier for needs. 

****

p26 Footnote 27 : concerning the libido, which can be found in “The position of the unconscious”.  J. Lacan, “La position de l’inconscient”, Écrits, p. 848, Fr. ed. : See The Position of the Unconscious (Bonneval Hospital): 31st October 1960: Jacques Lacan or here  : p275 of Bruce Fink’s translation : The libido is this lamella that the organism’s being takes to its true limit, which goes further than the body’s limit Its radical function in animals is materialized in a certain ethology by the sudden decline [chute] in an animal’s ability to intimidate other animals at the boundaries of its “territory.”

This lamella is an organ, as it is the instrument of an organism. It is sometimes almost palpable [comme sensible], as when an hysteric plays at testing its elasticity to the hilt.

Speaking subjects have the privilege of revealing the deadly meaning of this organ, and thereby its relation to sexuality. That is because the signifier as such, whose first purpose is to bar the subject, has brought into him the meaning of death. (The letter kills, but we learn this from the letter itself.) That is why every drive is virtually [virtuellement] is a death drive. 

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p26 Footnote 28 : At the level of the animal, he speaks of the libido in so far as it marks out the limits of the territory and he refers it to the loss that the living being is subject to in virtue of being sexed. J. Lacan, “Position of the unconscious”, Écrits, pp. 847-848 : See The Position of the Unconscious (Bonneval Hospital): 31st October 1960: Jacques Lacan or here  : p275 of Bruce Fink’s translation : See above quote

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p27 what psychoanalysis has apprehended in the breast has nothing to do with any relation whatsoever to the sensoriality of the mother’s body: its warmth, its smell, its presence and what you will. The breast, as it comes into play in the weaning complex, is a breast that belongs to the infant, it’s a breast that isn’t the mother’s, it’s a breast in which the cut, he says, passes between the mother’s body and the infant’s body. : See The Position of the Unconscious (Bonneval Hospital): 31st October 1960: Jacques Lacan or here  : p275 of Bruce Fink’s translation : Regarding what is represented thereof in the subject, what is striking is the type of anatomical cut (breathing new life into the etymological meaning of the word “anatomy”) by which the function of certain objects – which should not be called partial, but which stand apart from the others – is determined.

The breast, to take an example of the problems to which these objects give rise, is not merely a source of “regressive” nostalgia, having been a source of “regressive” nostalgia, having been a source of highly prized nourishment. It is, I am told, related to the mother’s body, to its warmth, and even to tender loving care. But that does not sufficiently explain its erotic value, which a painting (in Berlin) by Tiepolo, in the exalted horror with which it presents Saint Agatha after her ordeal, illustrates far better. 

ln fact, it is not a question of the breast,  in the senseof the mother’s womb, though one may mix as much as one likes resonances in which the signifier relies heavily on metaphor. It is a question of the breast specified in the function of weaning which prefigures castration.

Weaning has been too extensively situated, since Klein’s investigations, in the fantasy of the partition of the mother’s body for us not to suspect that the plane [plane in the geometrical sense] of separation passes between the breast and the mother, making the breast the lost object involved [en cause] in desire. 

For if we recall that mammalian organization places the young, from the embryo right up to the newborn, in a parasitical relation to the mother’s body, the breast appears as the same kind of organ – to be understood as the ectopia of one individual on another – as that constituted by the placenta at the beginning of the growth of a certain type of organism which remains specified by this intersection. 

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p27 Footnote 29 : “We have not been able to extend (these considerations on the object) up to this point which constitutes its crucial interest, that is to say the object (-phi) as ‘cause’ of the castration complex.”  J. Lacan, “The position of the unconscious”, Écrits, p. 850, note of 1966. : See The Position of the Unconscious (Bonneval Hospital): 31st October 1960: Jacques Lacan or here : p282 of Bruce Fink’s translation :  Footnote 82 . Let it be pointed out, nevertheless, that in restoring here, in an ironic way, the function of the “partial” object, without making the reference to regression in which it is usually shrouded (let it be understood that this reference can onlky be operative on the basis of the structure defining the ofject that I call object a), I have not been able to extend it to the point which constitutes its crucial interest, namely the object (-F) as “cause” of the castration complex.

But the castration complex, which is at the crux [noeud] of my current work, exceeds the limits assigned to [psychoanalytic] theory by tendencies in psychoanalysis that were claiming to be new shortly before the war and by which it is still affected as a whole. 

The size of the obstacle I must overcome here can be gauged by the time it took me to provide this sequel to my Rome discourse and by the fact that, even now as I edit it [for the 1966 Seuil edition], the original version still hasn’t been published.

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p28 Footnote 30 : he expounds in the article that follows it, called “Du Trieb de Freud et du désir du psychanalyste”.  J. Lacan, “Du Trieb de Freud et du désir du psychanalyste”, op. cit, pp. 851-854. : See Écrits : 1966 : Jacques Lacan or here  :  On Freud’s Trieb & the Psychoanalytic Desire : 7th January 1964 (Rome) : Jacques Lacan,  p722 to 725 of Écrits – the first Complete Edition in English, 2002 : p721 (English) p851 (French) : The drive, as it is constructed by Freud on the basis of the experience of the unconscious, prohibits psychologizing thought from resorting to “instinct,” with which it masks its ignorance by assuming the existence of morals in nature. 

It can never be often enough repeated, given the obstinacy of psycholo­gists who, as a group and per se, are in the service of technocratic exploitation, that the drive—the Freudian drive—has nothing to do with instinct (none of Freud’s expressions allows for confusion here). 

Libido is not sexual instinct. Its reduction, when taken to an extreme, to male desire, indicated by Freud, should suffice to alert us to this fact. 

Libido, in Freud’s work, is an energy that can be subjected to a kind of quantification which is all the easier to introduce in theory as it is useless, since only certain quanta of constancy are recognized therein. 

Its sexual colouring, so categorically maintained by Freud as its most cen­tral feature, is the colour of emptiness: suspended in the light of a gap. 

This gap is the gap desire encounters at the limits imposed upon it by the principle ironically referred to as the “pleasure principle,” the latter being relegated to a reality which, indeed, is but the field of praxis here.

It is from this very field that Freudianism hews a desire, the crux of which is essentially found in impossibilities.

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p29 Footnote 31 : “Radiophonie”, the text I read just now, whence comes the necessity for the “surplus jouissance” in order for the machine to work. cf. J. Lacan, “Radiophonie”, Scilicet 2/3, pp. 61-62. : : See Radiophonie: 9th April & 5th June 1970: Jacques Lacan  or here  :    Question V : What are its consequences on the plane of ? : p21 – 22 of Jack W. Stone’s translation : The efficacy of glottal stops at the siege of Jericho lets one think that here the wall makes an exception, to tell the truth sparing nothing on the number of turns necessary.

It is that the wall is not found, on this occasion, to be made of stone, but rather of the inflexible of an extra wailing.

And if this is the case, we rediscover the structure that is the wall of which we speak.

In defining it from relations articulated from their order, and such that in taking part there, one only does it at one’s own expense.

Expense of life or else of death. Expense of jouissance, that’s the main thing (voilà le primaire

Whence the necessity of the surplus enjoyment (plus-de-jouir) for the mechanism to turn, jouissance only indicating itself there so that one might have it from this effacing (effaçon), as a hole to fill. 

Do not be astonished that I pause (ressasse) here when ordinarily I hurry along my path. 

(87) It is that in remaking here an inaugural cut, I am not repeating it, I am showing it doubling to gather what falls from it. 

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p29  : From Beatrice, Dante obtains nothing but a fluttering of the eyelashes. That is sufficient for him, for the time being. That is to say, what he meets is the object “gaze” and the Other (here the other is Beatrice) remains barred to the subject. : Television: 31st January 1974 : Jacques Lacan or here  : p26-27 of Denis Hollier’s translation, published in October :  What is astonishing is not that he is happy without suspecting what reduces him to this state – his dependence on the structure – but that he gets an idea of beatitude, an idea which is forceful enough for him to feel himself exiled from it. 

Happily, on this point we have the poet giving the game away: Dante, whom I’ve just cited, and others, apart from those sluts who use classicism to fill their piggy-banks. 

A gaze, that of Beatrice – that is to say, a threefold noth­ing, a fluttering of the eyelids and the exquisite trash that re­sults from it-and there emerges that Other whom we can identify only through her jouissance: her whom he, Dante, can­ not satisfy, because from her, he can have only this look, only this object, but of whom he tells us that God fulfills her utterly; it is precisely by receiving the assurance of that from her own mouth that he arouses us. 

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p29 using the two circles of Euler as Lacan used them in Seminar XI: See Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts: 1963-1964 : beginning 15th January 1964 : Jacques Lacan or here  :  Seminar XI : 27th May 1964, p211 of Alan Sheridan’s translation 

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p31 that is precisely what Schreber showed us. Everything he described is a body which is by no means a desert of jouissance. It is a body which is invaded by jouissance, permanently.  : See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Probably Seminar III 25thJanuary 1956,  p104 of Russell Grigg’s translation : I spoke last time about displacements of behavior – one realizes that it can’t simply be a matter of rediscovering the mnemic, chronological localization of events, of restoring a piece of lost time, but that things also take place on the topographical level. The distinction in regression between entirely different registers is implicit here. In other words, what is constantly being forgotten is that it’s not the case that if one thing comes to the fore another loses its price, its value, within topographical regression. It’s here that events acquire their fundamental behavioral meaning.

And this is when narcissism was discovered. Freud realized that there are modifications to the imaginary structure of the world and that they interfere with modifications to the symbolic structure – this is really how it has to be described, since remembering necessarily takes place within the symbolic order.

When Freud explains delusion by a narcissistic regression of libido, with this withdrawal from objects ending in a disobjectualization, this means, at the point he has attained, that the desire that is to be recognized in delusion is situated on a completely different level from the desire that has to make itself recognized in neurosis.

If one doesn’t understand this, one will completely fail to see what differentiates psychosis from neurosis. Why should it be so difficult in psychosis to restore the subject’s relation to reality, when the delusion is in principle entirely legible? This, at least, is what can be read in some passages in Freud, which you have to know how to emphasize in a less summary way than is usual. Delusions are indeed legible, but they are also transcribed into another register. In neurosis, one always remains inside the symbolic order, with this duality of signifier and signified that Freud translates as the neurotic compromise. Delusions occur in a completely different register. They are legible, but there is no way out. How does this come about? This is the economic problem that remains open at the time Freud completes the Schreber case.

&

See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Probably Seminar III 16th November 1955,   p11 of Russell Grigg’s translation : Since discourse, the lunatic’s printed discourse, is at issue, it’s therefore manifest that we are in the symbolic order. Now, what is the actual material

of this discourse? At what level does the sense translated by Freud unfold? From what are the naming elements of this discourse borrowed? Generally speaking the raw material is his own body.

In man the relation to one’s own body characterizes, in the final analysis, the restricted, but really irreducible, field of the imaginary. If there is anything in man that corresponds to the imaginary function as it operates in animals, it’s everything that, in a fundamental manner but one that is always barely graspable, relates him to the general form of his body at a point called an erogenous zone. Only analytic experience has been able to seize this relationship, always at the limit of the symbolic, at its mainspring.

This is what the symbolic analysis of the Schreber case demonstrates for us. It’s only by entering through die symbolic that we can successfully make any inroads into the case.

&

See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Probably Seminar III 30th November 1955,  p39 of Russell Grigg’s translation : What I designated thus in my first communication to the group Evolution psychiatrique, which at the time was quite remarkably original, was aimed at the paranoid affinities between all knowledge of objects as such. All human knowledge stems from the dialectic of jealousy, which is a primordial manifestation of communication. It’s a matter of an observable generic notion, behavioristically observable. What takes place between two young children involves this fundamental transitivism expressed by the fact that one child who has beaten another can say- The other beat me. It’s not that he is lying – he is the other, literally.

This is the basis of the distinction between the human world and the ani-

mal world. Human objects are characterized by their neutrality and indefinite proliferation. They are not dependent on the preparation of any instinctual coaptation of the subject, in the way that there is coaptation, housing, of one chemical valency by another. What makes the human world a world covered with objects derives from the fact that the object of human interest is the object of the other’s desire.

How is this possible? It’s possible because the human ego is the other and because in the beginning the subject is closer to the form of the other than to the emergence of his own tendency. He is originally an inchoate collection of desires – there you have the true sense of the expression fragmented body – and the initial synthesis of the ego is essentially an alter ego, it is alienated. The desiring human subject is constructed around a center which is the other insofar as he gives the subject his unity, and the first encounter with the object is with the object as object of the other’s desire.

This defines, within the speech relationship, something that originates somewhere else – this is exactly the distinction between the imaginary and the real. A primitive otherness is included in the object, insofar as primitively it’s the object of rivalry and competition. It’s of interest only as the object of the other’s desire.

The said paranoid knowledge is knowledge founded on the rivalry of jealousy, over the course of the primary identification I have tried to define by means of the mirror stage. This rivalrous and competitive ground for the foundation of the object is precisely what is overcome in speech insofar as this involves a third party. Speech is always a pact, an agreement, people get on with one another, they agree – this is yours, this is mine, this is this, that is that. But the aggressive character of primitive competition leaves its mark on every type of discourse about the small other, about the Other as third party, about the object. It’s not for nothing that in Latin testimony is called testis and that one testifies on one’s balls. In everything of the order of testimony there is always some commitment by the subject, and a virtual struggle in which the organism is always latent.

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See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Seminar III 14th December 1955 : p69-70 of Russell Grigg’s translation : One can say that in this delusion God is essentially the opposite term in relation to the subject’s megalomania, but God as he is caught at his own game. Schreber’s delusion will in fact reveal that God, through having wanted to harness his forces and turn him into detritus, excrement, carrion, the object of all the exercises of destruction that he has allowed his intermediary mode to bring about, has been caught at his own game. Ultimately God’s greatest danger is to love Schreber, that transversally transversed zone, too much.

We shall have to structure the relationship between what guarantees the real in the other, that is, the presence and existence of the stable world of God, and Schreber the subject qua organic reality and fragmented body. We shall see, provided we borrow a number of references from analytic literature, that a major part of his fantasies, of his hallucinations, of his miraculous or marvellous construction, consists of elements in which all sorts of bodily equivalents are clearly recognizable. We shall see, for example, what the hallucination of the little men represents organically. But the pivot of these phenomena is the law, which here lies entirely within the imaginary dimension. I say it’s transversal because it’s diagonally opposed to the relation of subject to subject, the axis of effective speech.

&

See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Probably Seminar III 11th January 1956,  p74 of Russell Grigg’s translation : This is the requirement that my little square meets, which goes from the subject to the other and, in a way, here, from the symbolic towards the real, subject, ego, body, and in the contrary sense towards the big Other of intersubjectivity, the Other that you do not apprehend as long as it is a subject, that is, as long as it can lie, the Other that on the contrary one always finds in its place, the Other of the heavenly bodies, or, if you will, the stable system of the world, of the object, and, between the two, speech, with its three stages of the signifier, meaning, and discourse.

This is not a world system, but a system of reference for our own experience – this is how it is structured, and we can situate within it the various phenomenal manifestations with which we have to deal. We shall not understand a thing unless we take this structure seriously.

&

See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Probably Seminar III 15th February 1956,  p146 of Russell Grigg’s translation : Where shall we look for them, given that they escape libidinal investment? Is it sufficient to appeal to libidinal reinvestment of the body? This mechanism, commonly held to be that of narcissism, is explicitly invoked by Freud himself to explain the phenomenon of psychosis. Briefly put, in order to mobilize the delusional relationship, it’s supposed to be a matter of nothing other than enabling him, as one so quickly says, to become an object again.

From one angle this coincides with a number of the phenomena involved, but it doesn’t exhaust the problem. Each and every one of us knows, provided he’s a psychiatrist, that in a fully developed paranoiac there is no question of mobilizing this investment, while in schizophrenics the properly psychotic disturbance is as a rule much more extensive than in the paranoiac.

Wouldn’t this be because in the imaginary order there is no way of giving a precise meaning to the term narcissism? Alienation is constitutive of the imaginary order. Alienation is the imaginary as such. Nothing is to be expected from the way psychosis is explored at the level of the imaginary, since the imaginary mechanism is what gives psychotic alienation its form but not its dynamics.

This is the point we always get to together, and if we don’t get there unarmed, if we don’t give in, it’s precisely because in our exploration of analytic technique, and then of beyond the pleasure principle with the structural definition of the ego that it implies, we have the idea that beyond the little other of the imaginary we have to admit the existence of another Other.

It’s not only because we give it a capital letter that we are satisfied with it, but because we locate it as the necessary correlate of speech.

&

See Seminar III: The Psychoses: 1955-1956: from 16th November 1955: Jacques Lacan or here : Probably Seminar III 15th February 1956,  p150 of Russell Grigg’s translation : What is at issue when I speak of Verwerfung? At issue is the rejection of a primordial signifier into the outer shadows, a signifier that will henceforth be missing at this level. Here you have the fundamental mechanism that I posit as being at the basis of paranoia. It’s a matter of a primordial process of exclusion of an original within, which is not a bodily within but that of an initial body of signifiers. 

It’s inside this primordial body that Freud posits the constitution of a world of reality, which is already punctuated, already structured, in terms of signifiers. Freud then describes the entire operation by which representation and these already constituted objects are brought together. The subject’s initial apprehension of reality is the judgment of existence, which consists in saying – This is not my dream or my hallucination or my representation but an object. 

It’s a matter of testing the external by the internal – it’s Freud saying this, not me – , a matter of the constitution of the subject’s reality in a refinding of the object. 

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p31   That is what Freud described for the [developmental] phases of the libido, and which was later taken up as the oral phase, and the anal phase, which preceded the phallic phase. 

NOTE from Julia Evans : Freud never delineated developmental phases so developmental should not be added.  This point is taken up forcefully by Jacque Lacan in Seminar IV.  : See Seminar IV : The Object Relation & Freudian Structures 1956-1957 : begins 21st November 1956 : Jacques Lacan or here 

Notes & References for Jacques Lacan’s Seminar IV : 21st November 1956 by Julia Evans on 28th February 2017 or here 

Tracing Stages linked to Libido in Freud by Julia Evans here on 24th October 2017 see here  

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p32 One is the case of “Stanley” described by Margaret Mahler, :   See Some Observations on Disturbances of the EGO in a Case of Infantile Psychosis by Margaret S. Mahler , M.D. & Paula Elkisch , Ph.D. Pages 252-261   The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child,  Vol 8,  1953 Issue 1,   See here   

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p32 the case of “Joe” by Bruno Bettelheim. :  Probably  Feral Children and Autistic Children by Bruno Bettelheim,  American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 64, No. 5 (Mar., 1959), pp. 455-467 

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p35 Footnote 32 : A practical application, for example, is the few pages that Lacan devotes to the affects in Télévision. J. Lacan, Télévision, pp. 33-43. : See Television: 1974: Jacques Lacan : Availability given here  : p22 of D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson’s translation, in ‘Television, a challenge to the Establishment’ : p24 of October publication : 

It’s the same old thing when it comes to the story of my supposed neglect of affect.

I just want an answer on this point: does an affect have to do with the body? A discharge of adrenalin- is that body or not? It upsets its functions, true. But what is there in it that makes it come from the soul? What it discharges is thought.

So you have to consider whether my idea that the un­ conscious is structured like a language allows one to verify affect more seriously- than the idea that it is a commotion from which a better arrangement emerges. Because that’s what they oppose me with.

Does what I say about the unconscious go further than expecting affect to fall, adequate, into your lap? This adaequatio, being even more grotesque by coming on top of yet another one- really stacked- this time conjoining rei -of the thing­ with affectus – the affect whereby it will get repigeonholed. We had to make it into our century for doctors to come up with that one.

All I’ve done is rerelease what Freud states in an article of 1915 on repression, and in others that return to this subject, namely that affect is displaced. How to appreciate this dis­placement, if not so the basis of the subject, which is presupposed by the fact that it has no better means of occurring than through representation?

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p32 In Télévision, he situates three principal affects: anguish (anxiety), sadness, and “gai scavoir”,  : See Television: 1974: Jacques Lacan : Availability given here : p22 of D. Hollier, R. Krauss and A. Michelson’s translation, in ‘Television, a challenge to the Establishment’ : p26 of October publication : 

For example, we qualify sadness as depression, because we give it soul for support, or the psychological tension of Pierre Janet, the philosopher. But it isn’t a state of the soul, it is simply a moral failing, as Dante, and even Spinoza, said: a sin, which means a moral weakness, which is, ultimately, located only in relation to thought, that is, in the duty to be Well-spoken, to find one’s way in dealing with the unconscious, with the structure.

And if ever this weakness, as reject of the unconscious, ends in psychosis , there follows the return to the real of that which is rejected, that is, language; it is the manic excitation through which such a return becomes fatal.

In contrast with sadness there is the Gay Science [gay Sçavoir],10 which is a virtue. A virtue absolves no one from sin-which is, as everyone knows, original. The virtue that I designate as the Gay Science exemplifies it, by showing clearly of what it consists: not understanding, not a diving at the meaning, but a flying over it as low as possible without the meaning’s gumming up this virtue, thus enjoying [jouir] the deciphering, which implies that in the end Gay Science cannot but meet in it the Fall, the return into sin. : Footnote 10, Provençal troubadours used the expression gai savoir [gay science] to designate their poetry.

 Other texts by Jacques Lacan available in English, see  here  

Related texts

Melancholia, the Pain of Existence and Moral Cowardice : October1988 : Éric Laurent or here

Gay Knowledge, Sad Truth: 1997: Serge Cottet  or  here  

Some Moral Failings Called Depressions: February 1997: Pierre Skriabine or here 

COVID Sadness, The New Sorrow : 4th November 2020 : José Ramón Ubieto Pardo  or  here  

On COVID  here   

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p36 Footnote 33 where he says that the analysand, even though he has passed through what I have called the ordeal, will “make a cause for himself from surplus jouissance”. J. Lacan, “Lecture to the EFP [6/12/67]”, Scilicet 2/3, p. 26. : See Speech to the École freudienne de Paris on the Proposition : 6th December 1967 : Jacques Lacan  or here : p22  of Anthony Chadwick’s translation of the revised version published in Autres Écrits: 2001 : Jacques Lacan or here : This subject wakes up only to the fact that for each one in the world the affair becomes other than of being the fruit of evolution which of life makes for the said world a knowledge: yes, a no‐sense with which this world can sleep soundly.

Such a subject is constructed from all the analytical experience, when Lacan attempts through his algebra to preserve it from the mirage of being One: by the demand and the desire that he poses as instituted from the Other and [277] by the bar which re‐applies from being the very Other, to make it that the division of the subject is symbolized by the barred S, the which, subject from then on to unforeseeable affects, to an inarticulable desire of its place, makes itself a cause (as one would say: makes a reason for itself), makes itself a cause of surplus jouissance, of which however, by situating it from the object a, Lacan demonstrates very well the articulated desire, but from the place of the Other. 

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p36 Footnote 34  Initially he puts it in parentheses: “make a cause of surplus jouissance (as one might say to accept the inevitable [se faire une raison]).” J. Lacan, “Lecture to the EFP [6/12/67]”, Scilicet 2/3, p. 26. : see above

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p37 One might perhaps be tempted to say that the “authorising oneself”, rather than the master signifier – for that is the alternative we are faced with – has a centrifugal effect. It is hard to see why groups would form around the notion of “self-authorisation”. To do what? :    See ‘Proposal of 9th October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the School’: Jacques Lacan or here   : p1 of Cormac Gallagher’s translation :  Let us recall what exists among us.
First a principle: the psychoanalyst is authorised only by himself. 

This principle is inscribed in the original texts of the School and decides its position. 

This does not rule out the School guaranteeing that an analyst has been formed by it. 

It can do so on its own initiative. 

****

RELATED TEXTS

Jacques Lacan’s sayings excavated by Julia Evans on 17th October 2020 or  here   

The Real Presence and Slipperiness of the Body (LRO 248) : 11th October 2020 : Catherine Lacaze-Paule  or   here      

Lacanian Psychoanalysis Not Without the Body : 18th January 2020 (Dublin) : Bernard Seynhaeve (audio)  or   here       

Announcement of title for the 2020 NLS Congress, Interpretation, From Truth to Event : 18th June 2019 : Bernard Seynhaeve or  here    

Interpretation : From Truth to Event : 2nd June 2019 (Tel Aviv) : Éric Laurent  or  here   

The symptom in the perspective of the speaking body in civilisation (audio) : 19th May 2016 (London) : Éric Laurent or here 

The Unconscious and the Body Event : the full interview : July 2015 : Éric Laurent or here

The Unconscious and the Speaking Body : Paris : 17th April 2014 : Jacques-Alain Miller or here

On the origin of the Other and the post-traumatic object : 6th November 2004 (Lyon) : Éric Laurent or here  

Trauma in Reverse : 27th April 2002 (New York) : Éric Laurent or here 

Lacanian Biology and the Event of the Body : 12th & 19th May 1999 (Paris VIII) : Jacques-Alain Miller or here     

Interpretation and Truth : 1st July 1994 : Éric Laurent or here    

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Note : If links to any required text do not work, check www.LacanianWorksExchange.net. If a particular text or book remains absent, contact Julia Evans

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Julia Evans   

Practicing Lacanian Psychoanalyst,  London & Sandwich, Kent

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Further texts

Of the clinic  here 

Lacanian Transmission  here  

Some Lacanian History  here 

Topology  here 

From LW working groups  here

By Colette Soler   here    

By Sigmund Freud here 

Notes on texts by Sigmund Freud  here 

By Jacques Lacan here         

Notes on texts by Jacques Lacan here 

By Julia Evans here